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1. Introduction
It has widely been recognized that one of the most important innovations in the aviation 
industry is the development of hub-and-spoke (HS) networks. HS networks allow airlines to 
achieve “economies of traffic density” by combing traffic volumes on feeder routes, to 
enhance service quality with increased flight frequency, and to compete more strategically 
(Caves et al. 1984, Brueckner and Spiller 1994, Zhang 1996, Brueckner and Zhang 2001, and 
Brueckner 2004). Following deregulations in the US and European countries, hub-and-spoke 
networks have been extensively used in the aviation industry.  However, in international 
especially inter-continental markets, the primary network configuration has been the 
so-called “dog-bone” networks which employs two gateway hubs1 (Button 2009, 2012). This 
is partly due to the fact that most countries forbid a foreign airline to serve its domestic 
markets (i.e. cabotage), so that airlines in the origin-destination (OD) countries have to jointly 
offer international services via their gateway hubs by forming an international alliance or 
code-share agreement. Figure 1 illustrates a pure HS network and a dog-bone network. 
Clearly, the latter is essentially an extended/linked HS network.  In the case of an 
inter-continental market, it comprises of two gateway hubs, G1 and G2, located in two 
continents respectively, each connected to local spoke markets via feeder flights. One 
example of such a configuration is the alliance network by Lufthansa and Air China in the 
Europe-China market. In such a case G1 may represent Lufthansa’s hub at Frankfurt serving 
the intra-Europe market, whereas G2 may present Air China’s hub in Beijing which has 
extensive services to mainland China and some Asian destinations. Both Lufthansa and Air 
China are members of Star Alliance, thus they could jointly provide a connection service for 
passengers flying from Manchester, UK to Zhengzhou, China via their hub airports in 
Frankfurt and Beijing. 
1 In the literature, the dog-bone network is also referred to as the “dumb-bell” network. Because HS airlines may 
use more than one hub to serve markets with large geographic coverage, for clear reference we will consistently 
use the term of “dog-bone network” instead of alternative names such as dual-gateway or dual-hub networks.  
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(a)                                   (b) 
 
Fig. 1. Airline network configurations: (a) a pure HS network, and (b) a dog-bone network. 
 
The popular use of dog-bone networks was due to both operational and regulatory 
considerations. First, aircraft sizes for inter-continental flights are generally large, which are 
not economically feasible for direct flights linking small spoke destinations. In the case of a 
dog-bone network, large-sized and small-sized aircraft can be used to serve the hub-to-hub 
and hub-to-spoke/spoke-to-hub routes, respectively. Second, international regulations often 
prohibit airlines to develop extensive networks in foreign countries (Fu et al. 2010). As a 
result, airlines often have to form alliances (e.g. OneWorld, Star Alliance and Sky Team) or 
enter into code-sharing agreements to jointly offer international services via their existing 
hubs. This allows airlines to consolidate traffic volumes through their gateway hubs so that to 
further leverage the benefits of HS networks such as increased frequencies and lowered 
operation costs.  
 
However, in the past decades, the aviation industry has been experiencing some changes in 
technologies and regulatory policies. On the one hand, relatively small-sized aircraft are 
introduced which can serve long-distance routes efficiently (e.g., A350 and B787 can serve 
long distance routes with a seating capacity around 300 or less). Meanwhile, as more 
countries are liberalizing their skies, it is now possible for airlines to expand their networks 
extensively across national borders. Carriers in the Middle East such as Emirates, Etihad 
Airways and Qatar Airways, have been able to expand their HS networks to serve a large 
number of destinations in Europe, Asia, and North America. This allowed them to by-pass 
regional gateways and compete with airline alliances relying on   dog-bone networks. 
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Emirates, for example, can now serve 144 destinations around the world () directly out of 
Dubai2, where passengers only need to connect once for their inter-continental flights. Turkish 
Airlines, which developed extensive networks over Europe and Africa, has been following the 
similar strategy to expand its network in Asia Pacific.  
 
The fast expansion of the Middle East carriers has led to on-going policy debates and 
competition concerns. International air transport operates within the framework of the 1944 
Chicago Convention, under which airlines’ rights are primarily regulated by bilateral air 
services agreements (ASAs) between each country-pair. Other than a few regional open-skies 
in EU and ASEAN, most aviation liberalization have been implemented on a bilateral basis. 
This has led to the formation of dog-bone networks which are jointly operated by alliance 
airlines in the origin and destination (OD) countries. As HS networks expand beyond national 
borders, now airlines in a third country can also compete in this OD market by utilizing the 6th 
freedom. This could significantly change the ways airlines compete and thus the traditional 
bilateral negotiations of air transport liberalization. That is, when EU and China negotiate 
bilateral ASAs, they may have to consider the roles played by Middle East carriers, thus that 
the negotiation cannot be purely bilateral any more. Regulations on airline alliances or code 
share agreement may also be re-evaluated, as they significantly influence airline competition 
and operation.  
 
Airlines’ strategies of competition and network development also need to be revisited. Each 
type of networks has its own strength and weakness. The dog-bone network is likely to bring 
airlines substantial cost savings via traffic consolidation over existing networks. However, 
passengers will spend more time on flight connection. Global HS network is more convenient 
but can only serve sufficiently large destinations that can fill long-range wide-body aircraft. 
Despite the inter-continental HS network expansion by major Middle East carriers, it is 
unclear which network configuration, HS or dog-bone, will win the competition in the long 
                                                        
2 According to OAG database, as of late 2017 these include 40 destinations in Europe and 42 destinations in 
Asia, respectively. 
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term. If the two types of networks can co-exist, would they each secure certain niche markets 
with distinctive competitive advantage? Should governments take into account airline 
competition in ASA negotiations or should they focus on providing general infrastructures 
such as airport capacities? These policy and managerial issues need to be thoroughly 
addressed as more countries are liberalizing their skies. For example, mainland China has 
been adopting more liberalized policy in the international markets, notably those to Europe 
and ASEAN countries under its Belt-and-Road initiative. If the dog-bone network will 
continue to dominate the future aviation market, more investments should be made on 
existing and potential gateway hubs. Otherwise, European and Chinese airlines should 
re-think their alliance strategies and try to build their own global HS networks with more 
long-range aircraft.   
 
In summary, a better understanding of such a problem is important for both airlines and 
regulators. Airlines can identify their strength and weakness, and how they could optimize 
and reconfigure their networks in order to win competition with higher efficiency and better 
services. For regulators such as the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), a good 
assessment of the competition effects will help them design the related policies such as 
aviation liberalization (Fu et al., 2010, 2015), slots allocation at major airports (Li et al., 2010; 
Shen et al., 2015) and the approval of airline alliances or code share agreements. More 
importantly, regulators should not only take care of their national carriers, but also customers. 
If Chinese passengers enjoy substantially better services at lower costs due to competition, 
possibly from the competition from Middle-East carriers, then the Chinese government should 
promote liberalization even if Chinese airlines may lose some market shares. 
 
In the literature, a number of studies have modelled airline network configuration and airline 
competition. However, to the best of our knowledge, few have examined the rivalry between 
HS and dog-bone networks. The choices of alternative airline networks have been studied by 
Lederer and Nambimadom (1998) and Adler and Hashai (2005). However, the primary 
objective was to minimize the costs of airlines and passengers, thus airline competition was 
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not considered explicitly. Adler (2001) modelled a two-stage best-response game to identify 
the profitable hub choices and resultant market equilibria. This model was further extended by 
Adler (2005) to examine the most adaptable and profitable HS networks under airline 
competition in Western Europe. Adler and Smilowitz (2007) discussed the competition 
between dog-bone networks with and without airline alliances or mergers. However, possible 
rivalry with HS networks was not modelled and the study focused on airlines’ decisions only. 
Hansen (1990) and Takebayashi and Kanafani (2005) investigated the competitions between 
airlines running HS networks and point-to-point (PoP) networks. Alderighi et al. (2005) 
analytically demonstrated that HS networks and PoP networks may coexist at equilibrium. 
Pels et al. (2000) proposed a nested multinomial logit model to analyze airport competition 
and airline competition simultaneously. Silva et al. (2014) investigated how two symmetric 
airlines choose between fully connected networks and HS networks in the competition. They 
conclude that in addition to airport charges, other regulatory instruments on airlines’ route 
choices may be necessary to maximize social welfare. Network-based modeling has also been 
used to analyze a wide range of issues such as airline competition, slot allocation, 
airline-airport arrangements over simplified and HS networks (see for example, Hansen, 1990; 
Hong and Harker, 1992; Takebayashi and Kanafani, 2005; Li et al., 2010; Takebayashi, 2011; 
Saraswati and Hanaoka, 2014; Shen et al., 2015). Therefore, they cannot be used directly to 
examine the international markets in the presence of alternative network configurations.  
 
An associated strategic decision of airlines is the choice of gateway hubs. In certain cases, 
airlines use multi-hub networks to serve markets with large geographic coverage. For example, 
United Airlines and American Airlines each developed multiple hubs in the US.3 Air China 
has also been developing hubs in Beijing, Chengdu and Shenzhen in mainland China. 
Therefore, where necessary it may be possible for these airlines to add an alternative gateway 
hub in response to competition. This may also alleviate the capacity shortage and congestion 
issue at the saturated gateway airport. In most markets, however, such a strategy cannot be 
                                                        
3 Over the years, United has developed hubs in San Francisco, Denver, Chicago and Washington D.C., whereas 
American has developed domestic hubs in Dallas, Chicago, Miami, St. Louis, New York, and Los Angeles.  
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implemented without strong government support, because substantial changes in airline and 
airport designation,4 slot allocation and capacity investments at the (new) gateway airports 
are needed. In certain markets like China, the strategic planning for airports are developed or 
endorsed by the central regulator (e.g. CAAC).5 In other cases, governments invest on airport 
infrastructures but have limited influence over airlines’ hub choices.6 Either way, it would be 
useful to incorporate the (additional gateway) hub choice in the model, so that such strategic 
decisions can be made based on systematic analysis. As many other network design problems 
(NDPs), hub location is a strategic long-term decision. However, it is very difficult to 
precisely predict future demand in the planning stage. Therefore, it is important to incorporate 
demand uncertainty into NDPs. Lee and Dong (2009) explored the design of reverse logistics 
networks with both demand and supply uncertainty and concluded that the results from the 
stochastic problem are more suitable for practical decisions. Ukkusuri and Patil (2009) 
developed a multi-time-period NDP formulation considering both demand uncertainty and 
elasticity to model the future network investment. Compared with a single-stage NDP, this 
formulation can lead to 10%-30% higher expected consumer surplus. Yin et al. (2009) 
proposed three different stochastic models to determine the robust optimal improvement 
schemes for road networks. Chen et al. (2010) discussed an NDP with demand uncertainty by 
adopting three stochastic multi-objective models and obtained a Pareto optimal solution set. 
These studies mostly modelled uncertainty by generating a substantial number of samples 
from the assumed probability distributions. However, it is usually difficult to ascertain a 
probability distribution of future demand in the first place. Instead, there are usually clear 
seasonal patterns in the aviation industry. Therefore, Yang (2009, 2010) incorporated seasonal 
                                                        
4 Absent full open-sky liberalization, only designated airlines can provide international services between 
designated/approved destinations in the OD countries under ASAs.  
5 For example, in the 13th Five Year Plan for Civil Aviation Airports Development released by CAAC, which 
covers the plan during 2016-2020, it was indicated that 10 international hub airports will be developed, which 
include the airports in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Kunming, Shenzhen, Chongqin, Xi'an, Urumqi, 
Harbin.   
6 For example, De Neufville and Odoni (2003) noted that the Dulles airport in Washington DC and the Newark 
airport in New York/New Jersey experienced severe under-utilization for extended periods, because airlines are 
reluctant to switch their operations from existing hubs. In comparison, regulators in China, Korea and France can 
designate certain airlines/aviation services to selected airports. 
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demand variations into a two-stage stochastic programming model to study airline network 
designs. Such an approach is adopted in this study to model demand uncertainty.   
 
In order to fill the gap in research and contribute to the associated policy and managerial 
decision-making, this study proposes a stochastic model to investigate the competition and 
cooperation between airlines running dog-bone and HS networks in an inter-continental 
aviation market. The model considers the interactions among three types of stakeholders, 
namely a regulator, airlines and passengers. Before the actual passenger demand is observed, 
the aviation regulator maximizes the expected social welfare by choosing the additional 
gateway airports. Such a modelling approach is used to capture the important roles played by 
regulators in forming policies related to ASAs, slot allocation and capacity choices of 
gateway airports etc. Based on the chosen gateway and observed demand, airlines involved in 
the related markets, including two alliance airlines jointly operating a dog-bone network and 
an airline running an inter-continental HS network, compete by optimizing aircraft sizes, 
frequencies and airfares to maximize their own profits. The model is used to analyze the 
Europe - China aviation market, thus that the optimal gateway hub can be identified for 
different demand scenarios. The effects of aviation liberalization on airlines, passengers, and 
social welfare are evaluated respectively, allowing relevant recommendations on regulatory 
policy and managerial strategies to be made.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formulation of 
the model. Section 3 applies the model to the China-Europe aviation market so that the likely 
market equilibrium can be identified. Section 4 concludes the paper and provides 
recommendations for future studies. 
 
2. Model formulation 
Network configuration strategies are fundamental decisions of airlines. In this study, we 
consider a network with a set of nodes (airports) and a set of arcs (links), which are 
respectively denoted as N and A. A link a A  is defined as the direct linkage between a pair 
Airline Network Choice and Configuration 
Tu, Li, Fu and Lei 
8 
 
of airports. A route may consist of several links. Let K denote the set of airlines, and k be a 
generic element of K. kA A  is the set of associated links in the sub-network of airline k. 
G N  denotes the set of all international gateways, whereas G N  represents the set of 
candidate gateway airports, and W represents the set of all OD pairs. 
 
The choice of gateway airports is strategic and cannot be changed in the short term. However, 
it is extremely difficult to forecast long term travel demand at route level or airport level 
(Xiao et al. 2013, 2015). Therefore, it is important to explicitly consider demand uncertainty.  
Because air demands usually exhibit clear seasonal patterns and airlines adjust their service 
offerings regularly7, it would be useful to model 2 to 4 scenarios in the analysis which 
correspond to flight seasons or quarterly changes. To simplify the presentation of the problem 
while sufficiently characterize the key dynamics in the aviation market, the following 
assumptions are made in this study. 
 
A1. Two types of airlines are considered for the inter-continental aviation market, which 
include a carrier operating a HS network and the other is an airline that operates a traditional 
dog-bone network. In practice, the latter refers to two airlines in the OD markets which jointly 
offer the service through alliance or code-share agreements (e.g. Lufthansa and Air China in 
the Europe-China market). The airports are classified as the feeder airports and hub/gateway 
airports. The hub/gateway airports play the role of concentrating and distributing air 
passengers. A HS network involves only one hub airport, while the dog-bone network usually 
contains two international gateway airports, one for each continent. In a dog-bone network, 
the feeder airports are assumed to connect to all gateway airports at the same continent for the 
purpose of inter-continental transportation. In an HS network, the feeder airports are all 
connected to the unique hub airport. A passenger route involves at most two 
transfers/connections, which is in line with the industry reality. All the airports and airlines are 
                                                        
7 For example, there are two flight seasons a year, for which airlines systematically update their operation plans 
of frequencies, aircraft schedules and flight destinations. Moderate changes can also be introduced upon the 
approval and confirmation of regulators, air traffic controllers and airports. 
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pre-given, thus no entrant airlines are considered in our model. 
 
A2. The members of alliance jointly set airfares (i.e. airline alliance with anti-trust immunity) 
as if they are one single airline (Takebayashi, 2011). Each airline is allowed to join at most 
one alliance. It is further assumed that airlines are allowed to serve all city pairs, so that 
airlines’ operational decisions can be endogenously modelled (Berechman and de Wit, 1996; 
Yang, 2008). 
 
A3. The potential OD demand on each route is assumed to have a discrete distribution with a 
finite number of possible realizations called scenarios (Li et al., 2012; Yang, 2009, 2010). Let 
  be the set of finite scenarios and   be a realized demand scenario. 
 
A4. Three types of players are considered in the inter-continental aviation market, namely an 
aviation regulator, airlines and passengers. The regulator aims to maximize the expected 
social welfare by optimizing the locations of gateways before travel demands are observed. 
This can be a strong assumption as governments tend to maximize the benefits to their own 
countries. However, since the aviation sector offers significant positive externalities to the 
global economy, it is difficult to precisely allocate the associated benefits among different 
countries. Such an assumption is also consistent with the modeling of joint decisions of 
airlines running the dog-bone network, or markets when multilateral open-skies have been 
achieved (e.g. the EU single aviation market).  With a given demand scenario and a gateway 
scheme, each airline aims to maximize its own profit by optimizing the associated services 
(i.e. the choices of aircraft and flight frequencies) and airfares taking into account of 
passengers’ travel decisions. An elastic demand function is applied to capture the responses of 
air passengers to the airlines’ services and airfares.  
 
A5. We also consider the effects of congestion delay at the airports. If an airport is subject to 
capacity constraint, the airlines and air passengers landing or taking off this airport would 
incur congestion cost. The capacity of an airport is the maximum number of flights (i.e. 
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aircraft movements) that this airport can serve.  
 
A6. In this problem, we do not consider the yield management issue and the average airfares 
are considered as basic and static values (Hansen, 1990; Hsu and Wen, 2003). The types of 
aircraft of airlines are given in advance, and each airline is assumed to schedule only one type 
of aircraft on each link.  
 
2.1. Air passengers’ route choices 
For a given demand scenario  , the potential OD demand is fixed and the air passengers 
are assumed to make route choices based on their own perceptions of the disutility on 
alternative routes and services. Let kwR  denote the set of all possible routes served by airline 
k between OD pair w W . The travel disutility function krwu

 of route kwr R  served by 
airline k is computed as the weighted sum of the line-haul travel time krwt

, the schedule delay 
time at airports krwd

, an additional penalty term krw  to reflect passengers’ preferences over 
different trip pattern (i.e., non-stop, one-stop, or two-stop), the congestion delay time at the 
capacitated hub airports krwC

, and the airfares krwp

 (Kanafani and Ghobrial, 1985; Hsu and 
Wen, 2003; Li et al., 2010, 2011). When travel with HS network airlines, the passengers 
transfer just once. However, passengers may make at most two connections when they travel 
with airline alliances operating dog-bone networks. krwu

 can therefore be expressed as 
follows 
 
1 2 3 4 , , , ,krw krw krw krw krw krw kwu t d C p r R w W k K
    =  + +  + +      ,  (1) 
 
where 1  is the passenger’s value of line-haul travel time, 2  is the value of schedule delay 
time, 3  converts the additional penalty term into monetary cost, and 4  is passenger’s 
value of time for the congestion delay at the capacitated hub airports. 
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The line-haul travel time krwt

 on route kwr R  can be expressed as the sum of the travel 
time on all links along route k, which is specified as 
 
,  , , ,
k
krw ka ar kw
a A
t t r R w W k K 

=       ,  (2) 
 
where kat

 is the travel time on link a, assumed to be dependent on the distance of link a and 
the velocity of the aircraft that airline k allocated for that link. ar  equals 1 if link a is on 
route r, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The schedule delay time at airport refers to the time difference between passengers’ preferred 
departure time and the time of a schedule flight, which decreases with the flight frequency. 
The schedule delay time on route kwr R , krwd

 , can be specified as the sum of the schedule 
delays on all links along this route 
 
,  , , ,
k
krw ka ar kw
a A
d d r R w W k K 

=       ,  (3) 
 
where kad

 is the schedule delay on link a, which can be approximated as the quarter of the 
average headway according to Kanafani and Ghobrial (1985) 
 
,  , ,
4
ka k
ka
T
d a A k K
f


=     ,  (4) 
 
where T is the average operating duration of the airport over the period of analysis (T usually 
takes 18h/day, thus it can be converted to 22.5day/month), and kaf

 is the flight frequency of 
airline k on link a. 
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The congestion delay time on route kwr R , krwC

, can be expressed as the sum of the 
congestion delay at all the hub airports subject to the capacity constraints along this route 
 
,  , , ,
k
krw H ar Ha kw
H a A
C d r R w W k K

=        , (5) 
 
where Hd  is a flight’s delay at airport H, Ha  equals 1 if airport H is on link a, and 0 
otherwise. A flight’s delay time Hd  can be calculated as the ratio between the total number 
of flights and the capacity of airport H (Borger and Dender, 2006; Basso and Zhang, 2008; 
Gillen and Mantin, 2014; Silva et al., 2014), which is specified as 
 
H
H
H
F
d
C
= , (6) 
 
where H G  represents a capacitated hub airport. HF  is the sum of all aircraft movements 
(i.e. landing and taking off flights) at airport H, HC  is the capacity of airport H.  
 
The expected disutility function w  between OD pair w can therefore be expressed by the 
following formula (Oppenheim, 1995)  
 
( )
1
ln exp ,  ,
kw
w krw
k K r R
u w W
 
 
 = − −    
  
  ,   (7) 
 
where   measures the variation in passenger perceptions of travel disutility krwu
 . A higher 
value of  corresponds to smaller variation in passenger perceptions, and vice versa. 
 
For each demand scenario  , let 
wQ
  be the potential travel demand between OD pair 
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w. An elastic demand function is adopted to capture the responses of passengers to airlines’ 
services and airfares (Li et al., 2010, 2011; Saraswati and Hanaoka, 2014). Let wQ

 be the 
resultant OD demand, which is specified as follows 
 
( )exp  ,w w wQ Q w W  = −   ， ,   (8) 
 
where   is the demand dispersion factor that reflects the demand sensitivity to the expected 
travel disutility w
  between OD pair w.Therefore, the passenger volume krwq

 on route 
kwr R  served by airline k can be obtained by a multinomial logit formulation, which has 
been applied in many previous studies to model the route choice behaviors of air passengers 
(Davis, 1994; Lam et al., 2002; Li et al., 2010; Saraswati and Hanaoka, 2014). 
 
( )
( )
exp
,  , , ,
exp
kw
krw
krw w kw
kr w
k K r R
u
q Q r R w W k K
u

 


 
−
=     
− 
,  (9) 
 
The aggregated passenger flow kaq

 on link ka A  in the sub-network of airline k can be 
calculated with Eq. (9) as follows 
 
 
,  , ,
k
ka krw ar k
w W r R
q q a A k K 
 
=       .   (10) 
 
2.2. Airlines’ decisions on service qualities and airfares 
According to assumption A2,  alliance airlines can be treated as one single decision-maker. 
Thus we can formulate the profit maximization problem respectively for the HS network 
airline as well as for the airline alliance. Airlines usually adjust their operations and flight 
schedules according to the seasonal variations of demand. For a given demand scenario 
 , the airlines maximize their profits by competing in airfares, flight frequencies and 
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types of aircraft. The profit function k
  of airline k K  is defined as the difference 
between the total revenues and the total costs on all routes that this airline operates, which can 
be specified as follows 
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where k

p , k

f  and k

s  are the vectors of airfares, frequencies and capacities of aircraft of 
airline k, whereas k

−p , k

−f  and k

−s  are the vectors of corresponding variables for other 
airlines excluding airline k. krwp
  denotes the airfare on route kwr R , which is served by 
airline k. krwq
  and kaq
  are determined by the passenger route choice model (Error! 
Reference source not found.) - (10). a  is the marginal cost per passenger on link a, which 
includes the passenger-related costs such as the baggage handling cost, costs of meals on 
board and so on. ka
  is the marginal cost per flight on link a in the network of airline k, 
which includes various flight-based costs such as the pilot and crew wages, fuel costs, 
maintenance cost and so on.   is the marginal congestion cost that airlines incur at the 
capacitated airports. ( )kA H− ( ( )kA H+ ) denotes the set of links with a tail (head) node H in 
airline k’s network. Hd  is a flight’s delay at airport H. kaf
  is airline k’s frequency on link a. 
The first part on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) represents the total revenue of airline k. The 
second part contains the total passenger-related costs and the flight-related costs of the airline. 
The third part is the total congestion costs of airline k that are incurred in the capacitated hub 
airports. 
 
According to the empirical study of Swan and Adler (2006), the link distance and aircraft size 
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(in terms of number of seats) are two important factors determining the marginal cost per 
flight. They suggested to formulate ka
  as follows 
 
( ) ( )0 1 2 ,  , ,ka a ka kD s a A k K  = +   +       ,  (1) 
 
where aD  is the distance of link ka A , kas
  is the type of aircraft operated on link a by 
airline k. 0 , 1 , and 2  are the parameters determined by the link distance.  
 
Therefore, the profit maximization problem for airline k can be formulated as follows 
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where  , ,k k k  p f s  are the decision variables of airline k. The optimization model (13) – (15) 
maximizes the profit of airline k given other airlines’ services and airfares. Constraint (14) 
indicates that the aggregated passenger volume of link ka A  must not exceed the available 
number of seats provided by airline k on this link. Constraint (154) ensures that the airfares, 
flight frequencies and capacities of aircrafts are nonnegative.  
 
For profit maximization model (13) – (15), the Lagrangian relaxation and penalty function 
approaches are applied to incorporate the above side constraints into the objective function 
(13). The augmented Lagrangian penalty function for airline k can be formulated as follows 
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where   is a penalty constant. ka
  is the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraint 
(14), k
  is the corresponding vector. Therefore, the constrained maximization problem (13) 
- (15) is transformed into the following unconstrained maximization problem 
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Following the study of Li et al. (2010), the unconstrained maximization problem (17) can be 
solved by a heuristic solution algorithm that combines the diagonalization method and the 
Hooke-Jeeves method.  
 
2.3. Regulator’s decision on the additional international gateway airports 
Investment of additional gateway airports can facilitate airlines’ efforts to optimize their 
network configuration, improve flight frequency and thus passenger service quality, and 
alleviate the congestion at existing hub airports. In addition, other regulatory changes may 
also be necessary, such as ASA specifications of airline and airport designation, flight 
frequency and airport slot allocation. Such strategic decisions need to be made in the presence 
of demand uncertainty. Therefore, we consider a regulator aiming to maximize the expected 
social welfare of the whole system by optimizing the locations of gateway hubs. Its objective 
function is specified as follows 
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
,  (20) 
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where g G  is a candidate gateway airport. gx  is the decision variable, gx  equal 1 if 
airport g is set to be a gateway and 0 otherwise. P  and Z   are respectively the probability 
and social welfare of the specific demand scenario  . M is the maximum number of 
gateways that the regulator plans to develop. For each demand scenario  , the social 
welfare is calculated as the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus (i.e. 
airlines’ profits). According to Williams (1997) and Evans (1987), the consumer surplus 
represents the perceived benefits experienced by actual passenger demand and is measured in 
monetary units, which is specified as w
w W
q

 . Thus, the total social welfare Z   is specified 
as follows. 
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where x is the vector of regulator’s decisions  gx . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,    =Y x Y p x f x s x  is 
the vector of airlines’ strategies. Vector 

Q  is a function in x through airfare p , frequency 

f  and the types of aircrafts s , and is determined by the passenger choice model (1) - (10). 
Vector k
  is also a function in x through p , f  and s , which is determined by the 
airline’s profit maximization model (13) - (15). 
 
The maximization model (Error! Reference source not found.) - (21) is a 0-1 integer 
programming problem with the binary decision variable  gx . The objective function (18) 
maximizes the expected social welfare. Constraint (19) means that the total number of new 
gateway hubs must be less than the predefined value M. Constraints (20) state that the location 
variables are binary. In order to solve the 0-1 integer programming problem (18) – (21), we 
propose the following heuristic solution algorithm as depicted by the flowchart illustrated in 
Fig. 2.  
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Step 1. Initialization. Define a set of candidate gateway airports H  and a set of demand 
scenario  . 
Step 2. First loop operation. Set [ ]E Z  = −  as the lower bound of the expected social 
welfare E[Z] in Eq. (18) and  0,  hx h H = = x  as the initialized gateway scheme. 
Based on H , check all possible gateway schemes sequentially. Set the scheme counter 
i = 1. 
Step 3. Second loop operation. Perform all demand scenarios sequentially and set the scenario 
counter 1= . 
Step 4. Third loop operation (Demand-supply equilibrium). For a given gateway scheme and 
demand scenario, do the interactive process of demand and supply. Set counter j = 1. 
Step 4.1. Solve airline’s profit maximization model (13) - (15) and passengers’ route choice 
model (1) - (10) separately and sequentially for all airlines, so that to obtain the 
resultant passenger demand  ( ) ( )j jwQ =Q , the optimal frequencies, the types of 
aircrafts and airfares ( )jf , 
( )j
s  and 
( )j
p , and the corresponding airlines’ net 
profits  ( ) ( )j jk  =  . Then, calculate the relative variations in resultant passenger 
demand 
( )( )jr Q  and airlines’ profits ( )( )jr π  respectively by Eq. (22) and (23) 
(Hsu and Wen, 2003). 
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Step 4.2. Termination check for the third loop operation. If 
( )
1( )
jr   Q  and 
( )
2( )
jr   π  
( 1 and 2  are predefined), then compute the social welfare Z
  for the current 
demand scenario   and go to Step 5. Otherwise, set j = j + 1 and go to Step 4.1.  
Step 5. Termination check for the second loop operation. If all demand scenarios are 
performed, compute the expected social welfare 
( )[ ] iE Z  by Eq. (18) for gateway 
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scheme i. If ( )[ ] [ ]iE Z E Z  , ( )[ ] [ ] iE Z E Z =  and the optimal gateway scheme 
 ( )ihx =x .Then go to Step 6. Otherwise, set 1=+  and go to Step 4. 
Step 6. Termination check for the first loop operation. If all possible gateway schemes are 
checked, terminate the algorithm and report the optimal gateway scheme x  and the 
corresponding expected social welfare [ ]E Z  . Otherwise, set i = i +1, and go to Step 
3. 
 
Note that in Step 4, when the relative variations in the resultant passenger demand and 
airlines’ profits are small enough, we can conclude that a demand-supply equilibrium is 
reached. At equilibrium airlines’ market share on each OD pair is at optimal level, thus that 
their profit-maximizing decisions on the service qualities and airfares will not change given 
the competitors’ strategies. Similarly, passengers have no incentives to change their route 
choices, and so the demand-supply interaction convergences. 
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of the solution algorithm. 
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3. Case study for the China-Europe inter-continental aviation market 
3.1. Parameter specifications 
The specified model is used to study the China-Europe aviation market. Two airline 
decision-makers are considered for the China-Europe market. One is an airline alliance, which 
may represent the Star-alliance member airlines of Air China and Lufthansa. The two airlines 
have been together operating a dog-bone network via their hubs at Beijing and Frankfurt, and 
is modeled as one airline in our study Another is a HS network carrier, which may represent 
the Emirates. The Middle East airline has secured significant market shares in the 
China-Europe aviation market using its HS network. Therefore, in the “Base case”, the 
dog-bone network contains two international gateway hubs, namely the Beijing Capital 
Airport in China and Frankfurt Airport in Europe. In the HS network, the Dubai International 
Airport serves as the airlines’ global hub. Three candidate airports in Western China, namely 
the airports in Chengdu, Kunming and Xi’an, are considered by the aviation regulator for 
developing additional international gateways in China. Such a scenario is consistent with the 
strategic plan of the regulator CAAC (i.e. The 13th Five Year Plan for Civil Aviation Airports 
Development).  
 
For simplicity, we first assume that the traffic volumes are symmetric, and so the analysis can 
be restricted to one-way traffic. Real market data of OD traffic volumes between China and 
Europe in 2015 are compiled from the OAG and PaxIS databases, and the top 14 airports in 
China and top 10 airports in Europe are chosen for simulations. The list of airports are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Fig. 3 illustrates the locations of all relevant airports (including 
14 airports in China, 10 airports in Europe and the airport in Dubai). Because Shanghai 
Pudong Airport and Shanghai Hongqiao Airport are both located in Shanghai, they are 
modelled as one airport with the combined traffic volume. The time period considered is one 
month, and the corresponding OD demand matrix constructed based on the 2015 traffic 
volumes is reported in Table 3. 
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All other input parameters are obtained from real market data where possible or estimated 
based on previous studies. The flight distances of links ( aD  ) are compiled from the website 
of http://www.gcmap.com. The velocity of aircraft is assumed to be 700km/h, which is used 
to calculate the flight time between airports (including time for landing and take-off). The 
aircraft sizes are treated as continuous variables. Therefore, in the dog-bone network, aircraft 
capacity ranges (measured in seats) are assumed to be [250, 450] for the hub-to-hub routes, 
and [150, 400] for the hub-to-spoke/spoke-to-hub routes. In the HS network, aircraft capacity 
is assumed to take values in [250, 400]. The Beijing Capital Airport is assumed to be subject 
to capacity constraint and HC  is set to 461 flights per month for international services 
between China and Europe based on the statistics in 2015.  Passengers’ value of time 
parameters in the travel disutility function, 1 , 2 , and 3 , are respectively $ 20.5/h, 
$ 26.65/h and $ 20.5/h (Hsu and Wen, 2003; Li et al., 2010; Saraswati and Hanaoka, 2014). 
The demand dispersion factor   is set to be 0.0002, and the coefficient   is set to be 0.02 
(Takebayashi and Kanafani, 2005). Passengers’ value of time for flight delay 4  and 
airlines’ marginal congestion cost   are assumed to be $ 40 and $ 2500, respectively (Basso 
and Zhang, 2008). The marginal cost per passenger a  is chosen as $ 20 (Li et al., 2010). 
The coefficients 0 , 1  and 2  in the equation of marginal cost per flight are set to 722, 
104 and $ 0.019 respectively, for flights with a travel distance below 5000 km; and 2200, 211 
and $ 0.0115 respectively, for flights with a distance equal to or greater than 5000 km (Swan 
and Adler, 2006; Alder and Smilowitz, 2007). Additionally, based on the historical data and 
previous studies, three demand scenarios, namely the middle level (based on  real data of 
2015), the low level (about 80% of the middle level) and the high level (about 120% of the 
middle level), are adopted to model the seasonal/ uncertainty of air travel demand, which are 
reported in Table 4. The solution algorithms were coded in Matlab and run on a Thinkpad X1 
computer with an Inter® Core ™ i5 CPU (2.4-GHz) and 8 GB of RAM. 
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Table 1. 14 Chinese local airports. 
No. Airports Code 
1 Beijing Capital Airport PEK 
2 Shanghai Pudong Airport PVG 
3 Guangzhou Baiyun Airport CAN 
4 Chengdu Shuangliu Airport CTU 
5 Kunming Changshui Airport KMG 
6 Shanghai Hongqiao Airport SHA 
7 Xian Xianyang Airport XIY 
8 Chongqing Jiangbei Airport CKG 
9 Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport HGH 
10 Nanjing Lukou Airport NKG 
11 Xiamen Gaoqi Airport XMN 
12 Wuhan Tianhe Airport WUH 
13 Shenyang Taoxian Airport SHE 
14 Fuzhou Changle Airport FOC 
 
Table 2 10 European airports. 
NO. Airports Code 
1 London Heathrow Airport LHR 
2 Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport CDG 
3 Amsterdam Schiphol Airport AMS 
4 Frankfurt Airport FRA 
5 Istanbul Ataturk Airport IST 
6 Madrid Barajas Airport MAD 
7 Barcelona El Prat Airport BCN 
8 München Airport MUC 
9 Rome Fiumicino Airport FCO 
10 Milan Malpensa Airport MXP 
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Fig. 3. Locations of all relevant airports. 
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Table 3 OD demand matrix for the China-Europe aviation market (passengers/month). 
Destination 
Origin 
LHR CDG MXP MUC FCO AMS IST BCN MAD FRA 
PVG 16964 15034 7381 6186 4786 4632 4978 4358 3374 14988 
CAN 3099 3599 796 410 829 1178 2855 657 717 1127 
WUH 615 1371 112 92 152 140 121 47 80 288 
SHE 461 575 184 794 140 170 48 108 61 688 
CKG 589 544 297 121 405 108 119 102 186 274 
HGH 405 530 336 100 276 774 174 478 818 192 
NKG 455 341 118 206 91 113 44 64 97 2323 
XMN 1221 467 353 112 567 1153 73 231 540 432 
XIY 486 794 113 105 120 100 80 34 59 249 
KMG 265 976 76 49 139 104 28 36 50 217 
CTU 1755 1857 508 242 524 1161 508 210 293 1660 
PEK 16396 15386 5103 5642 4520 4883 4113 3147 3348 9576 
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Table 4 Three demand scenarios. 
Demand scenarios OD demand Probability 
Low demand 80% of the medium demand 0.33 
Medium demand Real OD demand of 2015 0.50 
High demand 120% of the medium demand 0.17 
3.2. Analysis of results 
The proposed model, which investigates the choices of gateway hubs and the competition 
between different kinds of airlines, is applied to the China-Europe inter-continental aviation 
market. The results with deterministic OD demand and stochastic OD demand are 
summarized and analyzed below. 
3.2.1. The results with deterministic OD demand 
In this part, the real OD demand of 2015 for China-Europe aviation market is considered, 
which means there is only one demand scenario. Assuming that the aviation regulator plans to 
develop one more international gateway hub in addition to Beijing in China (i.e., M = 1), there 
are three possible gateway schemes, each with one candidate airport. Table 5 lists the total 
social welfare of the whole system, the profits of two kinds of airlines and the resultant travel 
demand respectively for the three different gateway schemes as well as the base case, when 
the deterministic demand of 2015 is considered. It can be observed that Chengdu is the best 
choice for the additional gateway hub, leading to the highest social welfare of $ 1.1529 billion. 
Kunming is the worst choice with the lowest social welfare. Also, the gateway scheme of 
Chengdu leads to the highest total profits (the sum of all airlines’ profits) and the resultant 
passenger demand, which are $ 153.8203 million and 199807 passengers per month, 
respectively. Such modelling results are consistent with the fact that in 2015, the Chengdu 
Shuangliu Airport was ranked fourth among all the Chinese airports based on the yearly 
passenger throughput. 
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Comparing the results of the base case with those of new gateway airport, we can conclude 
that developing an additional gateway airport (either in Chengdu, Kunming or Xi’an) would 
improve the total social welfare and the total profits and attract more air passengers. However, 
the changes of the profits for the two kinds of airlines are different. Table 6 shows suggests 
that with additional gateway hub, the net profit of the Emirates is much less than that of the 
airline alliance, while in the base case, the Emirate earns more than the airline alliance. 
Consistent results can be found in changes of market shares. In the base case, the market share 
of the airline alliance is slightly smaller than that of Emirates. However, when a new gateway 
airport is developed, the market share of the airline alliance become much larger than that of 
Emirates. On the one hand, developing one more gateway airport in China may lead to 
reduced flight frequency on certain routes. On the other hand, it means that there is one more 
route option for each OD pair in the dog-bone network. Although services offered by Emirates 
have one less stop, passengers may fly shorter distances by taking the airline alliance’s flights. 
Shorter flying distance means lower time cost, cheaper ticket and correspondingly lower 
travel disutility. As a result, the airline alliance can increase its market share and the net 
profits with additional gateway. 
Table 5 Comparing different gateway schemes with deterministic demand of 2015. 
Gateway 
schemes 
Social welfare 
(billion $) 
The sum of profits 
(million $) 
Resultant demand 
(passengers/month) 
Base case 1.1415 147.3122 198844 
Chengdu 1.1529 153.8203 199807 
Kunming 1.1471 149.4837 199521 
Xi’an 1.1480 149.8602 199635 
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Table 6 Market share and net profits under different gateway schemes with deterministic 
demand of 2015. 
Gateway schemes Airlines 
Net profits 
(million $) 
Market share 
Base case 
Airline Alliance 
Emirates 
60.3142 
86.9980 
41.59% 
48.41% 
Chengdu 
Airline Alliance 
Emirates 
124.9019 
28.9184 
80.91% 
19.19% 
Kunming 
Airline Alliance 
Emirates 
99.1866 
50.2971 
67.08% 
32.92% 
Xi’an 
Airline Alliance 
Emirates 
125.4040 
24.4562 
81.38% 
18.62% 
Tables 7 and 8 investigate the effects of network competition on total social welfare and 
resultant air passengers. Comparing the results with and without network competition, we can 
find that Chengdu is always the best choice for the new gateway, with the total social welfare 
of $ 1.1529 and $ 1.1459, respectively. Furthermore, the network competition between the 
dog-bone network and the HS network leads to higher passenger demand and social welfare. 
This is intuitive as increased competition encourages airlines to improve the qualities of 
service and reduce airfares. However, it should be noted that the total welfare changes are 
moderate. Table 8 suggests that this is probably due to the fact that the overall market size 
only increased moderate. Table 6 suggests that different network configuration and 
competition scenarios will have significant impacts on the distribution of airlines’ market 
shares.  
Table 9 reports the total number of flights in Beijing Capital Airport under different choices of 
gateways. In the base case, all flights served by the dog-bone network are routed through 
Beijing, leading to a total of 475 flights per month in the China-Europe market. However, 
with an additional gateway developed, this number decreases to 359, 383, and 427 
respectively for the gateway schemes of Chengdu, Kunming, and Xi’an. With results reported 
in Tables 5, 7 and 8, it is clear that the development of new gateways can alleviate the 
congestion at the saturated hub airports without reducing total traffic volume, welfare and 
industry profits. On the contrary, it improves the overall industry performance although such 
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benefits are not distributed evenly among all stakeholders. 
Table 7 Comparing the total social welfares with and without airlines’ competition. 
Gateway schemes 
Social welfares (billion $) 
Only dog-bone network HS vs. dog-bone network 
Base case 1.1042 1.1415 
Chengdu 1.1459 1.1529 
Kunming 1.1395 1.1471 
Xi'an 1.1454 1.1480 
Table 8 Comparing the resultant demand with and without airlines’ competition. 
Gateway schemes 
Resultant travel demand (passengers/month) 
Only dog-bone network HS vs. dog-bone network 
Base case 185809 198844 
Chengdu 197918 199807 
Kunming 192578 199521 
Xi'an 195210 199635 
Table 9 Total number of flights at Beijing Capital Airport for different gateway schemes. 
Gateway schemes Base case Chengdu Kunming Xi’an 
Total number of flights 475 359 383 427 
3.2.2. The results with stochastic OD demand 
To control for demand uncertainty and seasonal variations, three demand scenarios are 
considered. The levels of the demand and the corresponding probability of each scenario are 
summarized in Table 4. As in the deterministic demand case, one more gateway in addition to 
Beijing capital airport is considered for the dog-bone network (i.e., M = 1). Table 10 reports 
the optimal gateway schemes under the three different demand scenarios. It is noted that with 
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low and medium levels of demand, the optimal choice of the additional gateway is always 
Chengdu, which lead to the social welfare values of $ 0.9199 and $ 1.1529 billion, 
respectively. However, when the demand further increases (i.e., the high demand scenario 
modelled), the optimal gateway to be added is Xi’an. When demand is relatively low, the 
Beijing Capital Airport is capable of serving almost all passengers from Beijing and some 
passengers originating from other cities. The newly added gateway airport mainly attracts 
passengers in its surrounding areas. The throughput of Chengdu is much larger than those of 
other candidate gateways. Therefore, choosing Chengdu as the new gateway leads to lower 
passenger disutility than Kunming and Xi’an. However, when the demand is quite high, the 
Beijing Capital Airport becomes saturated which forces many passengers, including the 
passengers originated from Beijing, to fly through the new gateway airport rather than 
through Beijing. Compared with Chengdu, the travel distances between Xi’an-Beijing, and 
Xi’an-Frankfurt are shorter. This leads to slightly higher welfare when Xi’an is chosen 
compared to the case of Chengdu gateway.  Table 11 summarizes the expected social welfare 
for different candidate gateways. That is, considering all possible demand levels, Chengdu is 
the best choice for the new gateway airport. 
Table 10 Optimal gateway schemes for three demand scenarios. 
Demand scenarios Low demand Medium demand High demand 
Optimal gateway airport Chengdu Chengdu Xi’an 
Social welfare (billion $) 0.9199 1.1529 1.3894 
Table 11 Expected social welfare for different gateway schemes. 
Gateway schemes Expected social welfare (billion $) 
Base case 1.1037 
Chengdu 1.1158 
Kunming 1.1104 
Xi’an 1.1127 
Passenger volumes for the China-Europe aviation market have been increasing over the years. 
By the end of 2015, the traffic volume of China-Europe aviation market had increased by 
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61% over the 2010 level, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of about 10%. 
Assuming a demand growth rate of 10% for the next decade, traffic demand in 2025 will be 
259% of the traffic level in 2015. We consider the case when at most two new gateway 
airports can be added in China (i.e., M = 2). This leads to six possible gateway schemes 
according to constraint (19), namely three schemes with only one more gateway airport and 
three schemes with two more gateway airports in addition to Beijing. Table 12 summarizes 
the optimal gateway schemes in the case of one more gateway and two more gateway airports, 
respectively. It can be observed that Xi’an and Chengdu + Xi’an are respectively the best 
choices. The social welfare of the Xi’an gateway scheme is $ 4.6 million/per month lower 
than that of the scheme with Chengdu + Xi’an. This suggests that when the level of the 
passenger demand is sufficiently high, it is better to add two new gateways rather than one, 
with the optimal choices being Chengdu and Xi’an in addition to the established gateway in 
Beijing.   
Table 12 Results for different gateway schemes with forecasted demand of 2025. 
Optimal gateway scheme Social welfare (billion $) 
Resultant demand 
(passengers/month) 
Xi’an 3.0055 521070 
Chengdu + Xi’an 3.0101 522902 
4. Summary and conclusions
Significant changes are taking place in the global aviation industry. More countries are 
liberalizing their skies to promote the aviation industry and the associated sectors such as 
trade, tourism and logistics. Meanwhile, medium-sized aircraft capable of long-range flights 
are being introduced. As a result, some airlines are able to expand their HS networks to serve 
inter-continental markets that have been dominated by dog-bone network operators. Such 
market dynamics have raised important questions to the aviation industry. A better 
understanding of such a scenario is important for both airlines and regulators. Airlines can 
identify their strength and weakness, and how they could optimize and reconfigure their 
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networks in order to win competition with higher efficiency and better services. For regulators, 
a good assessment of the competition effects will help them to design the related policies such 
as aviation liberalization, slots allocation at major airports, and the approval of airline 
alliances or code share agreements. Where needed, additional investments may be needed to 
promote the development of additional gateway hubs.  However, few studies have explicitly 
modelled the competition between these aviation networks. Even less is known on their 
implications to airline network configurations, government policies, and resultant impacts to 
passengers. This paper aims to answer these questions with an integrated model on airline 
network rivalry and configuration taking into account the possible addition of gateway 
airports in the dog-bone networks.  Passenger demand uncertainty and seasonal variations 
are explicitly considered by modelling the OD demands to have a discrete distribution with 
finite growth scenarios. A stochastic model is developed to characterize the decisions of a 
welfare-maximizing regulator, profit-maximizing airlines and disutility-minimizing 
passengers. Such a model allows the identification of market equilibrium when airlines 
compete with different types of networks, where the effects of alternative network 
configurations can be tested and quantified. Such a framework can help airlines to identify 
their strength and weakness, and how they could optimize and reconfigure their networks in 
order to win competition with higher efficiency and better services. It also helps regulators to 
design the related policies such as aviation liberalization, slots allocation at major airports, 
and the approval of airline alliances or code share agreements. It also helps government to 
develop and promote new gateway airports in liberalizing markets. 
The proposed model is applied to study the China-Europe aviation market, which leads to 
some interesting and meaningful findings.  For example, the optimal gateway location with 
deterministic demand is different from that with uncertain demand. In the market studied with 
deterministic demand, the optimal choice of the new gateway is Chengdu at relatively low 
demand levels (80% and 100% of the actual traffic volumes in 2015).  However, Xi’an 
becomes the optimal choice at a higher demand level (120% of the 2015 traffic volume). 
When the demand is stochastic, Chengdu is the best choice which leads to the highest 
Airline Network Choice and Configuration 
Tu, Li, Fu and Lei 
33 
expected social welfare. In addition, our model also suggests that as demand grows, more 
gateway airports are needed for the benefits of the aviation industry and the overall economy. 
Last, the competition between the airline networks will benefit the air passengers as well as 
the whole system. 
Although we have tried to provide some useful insights for the governments and airlines 
based on the current model, we were forced to impose a few simplifying assumptions and 
calibrations. For example, we considered a relatively small network with 12 airports in China 
and 10 airports in Europe. This is mainly due to the difficulties in compiling data for a large 
OD demand matrix, and the computational challenges in solving the proposed stochastic 
model for a large network. It would be valuable to develop new methods to solve large-scale 
network problems effectively in future research, so as the developed model can solve the 
market equilibrium in realistic inter-continental markets. For the same consideration, it would 
be useful to model more airlines and alliances.  Finally, both Beijing and Chengdu are 
constructing their second airports. It would be useful to incorporate multi-airport systems in 
our models. These extensions will further enhance the value of the proposed model. 
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